

# Preliminary observations based on Flow-Based market simulations

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# Internal parallel run results – Disclaimers regarding the capacity calculation data

- Two DC-interconnectors are missing in the FB domains
- The CGMs used are not yet fully operational Adjustments and additional information is still pending (temperature dependency, operational forecasting...)
- The FB domains are yet not fully validated from an operational point of view
- The NTCs are operational (i.e. from the DA market), thus not based on the CGMs applied for FB The missing DCs has been removed
- Market results are obtained by using the PX simulation facility







## Internal parallel-run results – week 35, 36


## Some highlights


#### Nordic in total

- Welfare economic gain,
- Lower consumer surplus
- Higher producer surplus
- Lower congestion income

#### Main effects are in Sweden and Norway

- Higher degree of meshed AC-grid in these two countries
- Consumer surplus reduced in Sweden while increased in Norway
- Producer surplus increased in Sweden while reduced in Norway
















## IPR results – week 36: Prices (1/2)











#### Some highlights

- of better market access for the cheap hydropower
- Lower prices in NO1 and NO3 because of better access to cheap hydropower from SE1
- Increased prices in the highly populated SE3 because of more power is transferred to the southern DCs and also to NO1












# IPR results – week 36: Prices (2/2)




















## IPR results - week 36: Price differences






















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
# Deep-dive: Solutions for 09/09 2021, 19:00





### Some highlights

- Higher price in SE3 & SE1
- Non-intuitive AC-flows
- Non-intuitive DC-flows
- Higher flows on most DCs













# Definition of an optimal FB market equilibrium

• The first order condition for a global welfare optimum\* is:

$$P^i = \lambda - \sum_n \rho_n \, PTDF_n^i \qquad \qquad P^i \qquad = \text{The price in bidding zone i}$$
 
$$\lambda \qquad = \text{The Price in the slack node (not the system price)}$$
 
$$\rho_n \qquad = \text{Shadow price of a constraining grid element n}$$
 
$$\text{Increase in the SEW by a marginal relaxation for the constrained element n}$$
 
$$PTDF_n^i \qquad = \text{The zone-to-slack PTDF of bidding zone i on CNE n}$$
 
$$PTDF_n^{ij} \qquad = \text{The zone-to-zone PTDF for BZ}_i - \text{BZ}_i \text{ on CNE n}$$

• The marginal value of a bilateral trade from BZi to BZj can be derived from the first order condition:

$$\left(\mathbf{P}^{\mathbf{j}} - \mathbf{P}^{\mathbf{i}}\right) = \sum_{\mathbf{n}} \rho_{\mathbf{n}} * \mathbf{PTDF}_{\mathbf{n}}^{\mathbf{i}\mathbf{j}} \qquad \qquad \rho_{n} \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \rho_{n} \left(RAM_{n} - \sum_{i} NP_{i} * PTDF_{n}^{i}\right) = 0$$


• A non-intuitive flow from high price to low price will have an exactly offsetting impact on the grid


<sup>\*</sup> Darryl R. Biggar & Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh (2014): "The Economics of Electricity Markets", IEEE Press and John Wiley & Sons Ltd, ISBN 978 11 18775752





# Deep-dive: Solutions for 09/09 2021, 19:00





$$P_{Fin}$$
-  $P_{SE3}$  = -47,258

$$\rho_1 * PTDF_1^{SE3-FI} = -45.274$$

+ 
$$\rho_2 * PTDF_2^{SE3-FI}$$
 = -1.984 =-47,258











# Deep-dive: Solutions for 09/09 2021, 19:00





$P_{DK1}$ - $P_{DK2}$	= -0,623
$\rho_1 * PTDF_1^{DK2-DK1}$	= -0.027
+ $\rho_2 * PTDF_2^{DK2-DK1}$	= 0.007
+ $\rho_3 * PTDF_3^{DK2-DK1}$	= -0.603

### Why an impact on CNEC1 and CNE2?

The border between DK2 and SE4 is actually AC-4 lines. Due to the DC-model being without AC losses, a bilateral trade between DK2 and DK2\_storebælt generates two opposite, but equally sized, flows on these AC-lines. Thus, a very small relief is generated on the high cost CNEC1.











=-0,623

# Deep-dive: Solutions for 09/09 2021 - 19:00





$$P_{SE2}$$
-  $P_{NO3}$  = -0,833

$$\rho_1 * PTDF_1^{NO3-SE2} = -6.619$$

+ 
$$\rho_2 * PTDF_2^{NO3-SE2}$$
 = 5.788 =-0,833











# Deep-dive: Solutions for 09/09 2021 - 19:00





 $P_{DK2}$ -  $P_{DK1}$  = -10,330

 $\rho_1 * PTDF_1^{DK2-DK1} = -10.320$ 

+  $\rho_2 * PTDF_2^{DK2-DK1} = -0.010$ 

= -10,330







